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In a global community where social and economical environment is growingly unstable, 
the ability of public organisations to readjust to new strategic challenges has become an 
imperative. The globalisation of markets presents new pressures on national economies 
as well as on public administrations, as these constitute a pillar of productivity and 
competitiveness. Public organisations are essentially a construct of people and not only 
its physical structures or its formal organisational chart. The discussion on models of 
public employment and human resources management is therefore – and more than ever 
- relevant in public administration, as it is in politics or in civil society. In fact, public 
managers are considered to be the main catalysts in the change process as well as in 
assuring that public administration contributes to social and economic competitiveness. 
Both private and public sector success is closely tied to the quality and professionalism 
of managers (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2003). 
Although international experience reveals the existence of different solutions in 
recruitment and performance evaluation models, they are always linked to local cultural 
and political history of bureaucratic elite. Administrative reform and the change process 
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must therefore take into consideration the cultural environment, and the Portuguese case 
is no exception to the rule (Araújo, 1999; Rocha, 2001). 
All main reformist trends in western countries, inspired by different organisational 
theories and concepts and driven by distinct political orientations, have one aspect 
which is essential to the link between political power and administrative elite: Trust. 
This key-factor of institutional loyalty in public office (Page & Wright, 1999) can 
nonetheless be interpreted and applied in numerous and very different ways. 
 
Administrative evolution 
In the last 15 years, Portugal has seen succeeding approaches to the recruitment and the 
evaluation of public managers. With the fall of the dictatorial regime in the mid-1970’s, 
public managers where no longer appointed for life, but in a temporary commission 
regime. In 1987, the first democratic majority government centralised administrative 
power in the hands of politicians and in 1989, government members were legally 
allowed to recruit public managers in the private labour market, with the intent of 
developing competence, loyalty and efficiency. In 2004, the implementation of the new 
Integrated Evaluation System for Public Administration1 introduces the management-
by-objectives concept in the performance assessment process. This was an abrupt 
change with the traditional system, which had been subverted to avoid differentiation of 
performances by establishing the common practice of giving the maximum grade to 
everyone. Nevertheless, this new system is applicable only to civil servants and 
intermediate managers, leaving top-level managers out. The presumption is that top 
managers are evaluated on the basis of the organisation’s results. But in reality, public 
organisations are not evaluated in terms of results, be they service delivery or 
management performance. Although the general law indicates that the evaluation 
system must be applied to both individual and organisational levels (public servants and 
public services), only the individual performance evaluation was in fact implemented. 
The binding of objectives, goals and performance indicators can only be possible in a 
scheme of linkage and interdependency between the performances in the different 
hierarchical grades. However, one must not forget that the absence of a formal sanction 
factor for top managers, in the case of poor performance, emerges as a relative injustice 
                                                
1 SIADAP – Sistema Integrado de Avaliação do Desempenho na Administração Pública, established by 
the Law N.º10/2004, published in March 22nd 2004 and the Regulatory Decree N.º19-A/2004, published 
in May 14th 2004 
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factor, as all other public servants have more rigorous conditions in this matter. Public 
servants can have their professional career stall for poor performance or sped up for 
good performance. The effective assessment of top managers’ performance is left to the 
political power, which appointed them, therefore enhancing personal trust and 
institutional loyalty as key-factors in the evaluation process. 
In an attempt to re-design this evaluation system and to incorporate organisational 
performance, linking it to the evaluation of top managers, the government has very 
recently announced the preparation of new legislation in the field of performance 
evaluation, which should be implemented by 2008. Although the specific characteristics 
of the new model are not completely known yet, since negotiations with public workers’ 
organisations are still due, some relevant changes have been revealed by government 
members. The intention is to establish an effective three-way performance evaluation 
system, for public services, public managers and public servants, maintaining the focus 
on the assessment based on objectives. However, there seems to be no news in respect 
to top managers, since the focus remains on the monitoring of their mission statements, 
which are still not being implemented in all cases. 
In fact, new public manager statute2, published in 2007, does not introduce a rigorous 
performance evaluation method or strict consequences for poor and good results in the 
case of top managers, leaving once again the decision in the hand of political power. 
 
Public Service Redesign 
In pure bureaucratic administrative areas, the discussion on recruitment and evaluation 
models for top managers would not go much further, but in public service areas, where 
new organisational designs emerge, deeper questions arise. In fact, for the last three 
decades, studies have increasingly been pointing out the need to ‘privatise’ workplace 
relations in public administration (Osborne & Gaebler, 1992) and have consequently 
increased attention in regard to human capital expenses. As managerial principles were 
applied in many western countries during the last twenty years of the 20th century, 
successive attempts of downsizing public employment were carried out through 
methods like contracting-out to face occasional needs in qualified human resources 
(Kickert, 1999, Rhodes, 1995). 
                                                
2 Decreto-Lei N.º71/2007, published in March 27th 2007 
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But recent history shows that in some traditionally public domains, Portuguese Public 
Administration has gone further in redesigning its administrative organisation. During 
the last decade, Portugal has in fact seen many public services change its organisational 
and legal framework. To name some examples, we now find public hospitals that are 
being managed and administrated by private companies, local authorities for housing, 
urban development, parking, transportation or water and waste management turned into 
public owned companies. This conceptual shift is in line with the European and western 
approach to the wider macro-economic model, as major basic services have been 
privatised or semi-privatised in the past, like energy (electricity and fuel), 
telecommunications and post, transportation, road management, etc. 
In most cases, the market for public services is more constrained than the private 
market, sometimes even totally closed to private competition. One common approach is 
to argue in favour of private-like management and operation models, but only to some 
extent. In Portugal, this increasing pseudo-privatisation trend gives way to 
organisational designs that benefit from both private and public rule. In these cases, as 
throughout public administration, top managers are selected and evaluated within the 
political sphere, furthermore raising the question of accountability. 
 
Managers’ accountability 
The fundamental task of a manager is effectiveness. But to evaluate it, it is necessary to 
measure managers’ performance by establishing activity plans as well as monitoring 
and control instruments. A recent OECD study (2005) points out the fact that politicians 
rarely use performance information in decision-making processes. This fact reveals that 
in general, the real performance of public top managers is not taken in consideration in 
political decisions. According to Schedler (2004), rarely are politicians guided by 
performance measures or evaluations when taking political decisions. 
Nevertheless, one must not forget that the decision to choose a top manager in public 
administration - and consequently to evaluate him - can be considered as being more 
than a political decision, but also a pragmatic decision upon which can depend the 
global performance of a public entity. Moynihan (2005) believes that in order for 
administrative reform to transform public administrations into organisations that 
actively seek results, it is necessary that performance evaluation becomes part of a 
paradigm that is reproduced, multiplied and apprehended by the entire organisation. 
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In Portugal, the implementation of the new Integrated Evaluation System for Public 
Administration suggests that an effective evaluation implies the adoption of a cascading 
goals approach, from the top of the hierarchy to its operational base. In fact, 
notwithstanding any demerits it may have, this new system has the merit of trying to 
break with a predominantly passive cultural pattern, rehearsing a new evaluative 
intervention that is progressively more oriented towards meritocracy and not only 
seniority. However, as stated before, this new evaluation system has left top-level 
managers out, being applicable only to civil servants and intermediate level managers. 
In recent years in Portugal, different legal approaches have changed the way managers 
are recruited into Public Administration, and two recent and fundamental laws have 
drawn a new paradigm. The 2004 Law nº23, which approved the Statute of Management 
Personnel in Services and Organisations of Central, Regional and Local State 
Administration, sets out in Section II of Chapter II the rules for the recruitment and 
selection of intermediate management positions. Within this framework, Article 20 
established the following pre-requisites for management positions: 
(1) Graduate’s degree (some exceptions are allowed), 
(2) A minimum period of professional experience, and 
(3) The approval in a specific training course of Top Management in Public 
Administration. 
In accordance with Article 21, the selection of intermediate managers has abandoned 
the competition procedure. Tavares (2004) argues that this new management statute has 
essentially served the purpose of dealing with deficits in public administration such as 
weak leadership culture, reduced autonomy, lack of specific training and the 
maintenance of bureaucratic and slow selection methods. 
The 2005 Law nº514 establishes rules for the appointment of top managers in public 
administration and reintroduces the situation prior to 2004 (revoking the 19 months old 
Law nº2/2004) in relation to the recruitment of intermediate managers. In fact, Article 
20 establishes that ‘ intermediate managers are recruited by a competition procedure ’. 
In the same document, Article 21 states that there must be a jury composed of 
(1) The top manager of the institution, 
(2) One other manager in the same or higher level and grade than the position to be 
filled, and  
                                                
3 Law N.º2/2004, published in January, 15 2004 
4 Law N.51/2005, published in August, 30 2005 
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(3) An individual of recognized competence in the respective functional area, appointed 
by a higher education institution or public association that represents the corresponding 
profession. 
The decision on the choice of the candidate must be sustained only on the proposed 
nomination, where the jury must indicate the reasons for its choice. With this system in 
place, only top managers are appointed directly by the government. 
 
In terms of evaluation, one can find different arguments of statutory, functional, empiric 
or scientific origin to justify the differentiation of instruments and methods of 
evaluating the performance of top managers5. Section II of the Law nº2/2004 establishes 
the “Principles of action” for managers. Article 3 describes the ‘ Mission ’, Article 4 the 
‘ Principles of General ethics ’ and Article 5 the ‘ Principles of management ’. This 
Article states that managers ‘ should promote a result-oriented management, according 
to annual objectives ’. The evaluation of this result-oriented management is later 
partially revisited in Article 14, which states that ‘management personnel will be 
evaluated in terms to be defined in proper legislation, with the intent of appraising the 
performance in their respective responsibility areas’. This setting results in the 
perpetuation of the non-existence of evaluation for top managers. 
Only the Law nº51/2005 presents some news in relation to the evaluation of top 
managers in Portuguese Public Administration. Article 14 states that ‘ first degree top 
managers are evaluated according to the level of fulfilment of objectives established in 
the mission statement which Article 19-A refers ’. This article, added to the Law reads 
as follows: 
 
‘ Article 14 – Mission Statement 
1. When appointed, the competent member of government and the 
first degree top manager sign a mission statement, which constitutes 
a management agreement where objectives to be attained over the 
appointment period are explicitly defined, quantified and scheduled. 
2. The mission statement can establish, in terms to be regulated in 
the future, the attribution of management awards for services or 
                                                
5 As stated before, in the present Portuguese Public Administration, intermediate managers (service 
director and head of division) are evaluated according to SIADAP rules. 
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entities and/or for the manager, according to the progressive 
attainment of the defined objectives. ’ 
 
The 2005 Ministers Council Resolution nº199 also refers the importance of the mission 
statement of the top manager of a public institution, mainly because it should act as the 
base element for establishing cascading objectives for the remaining managers as well 
as for all workers. 
 
Page & Wright (1999) state that there is a sound assumption that, despite an 
administration’s degree of neutrality and independence from politicians and political 
parties, any person that serves the State should respect the institutional loyalty principle. 
There is nowadays a common tendency in more depoliticised administrative systems to 
seek “trustworthy servants” for top-management positions. However, the use of this 
term has a reference to the concept of trust in its wider sense, not only political.  
According to Romzek (2000), one can find four different types of accountability in 
organisations: hierarchical, legal, political and professional. When replacing traditional 
administrative structures with new modern ones, the former emphasis on hierarchical 
and political accountability (based on internal control and supervision and dependant on 
political power) is in theory shifted towards legal accountability (performance 
evaluation and contract compliance) and professional accountability (practice expertise, 
intrinsic norms and working models). In practice, this shift is rarely observed in public 
services for which new management settings and organisational models have been 
implemented. New performance assessment instruments have been approved, as from 
2005 on, all appointed top-level managers have to agree with their governmental 
counterpart on a mission statement, which establishes specific goals to be achieved 
during their appointment period. However, the initiative to confront managers with 
these instruments on the basis of their achievements and results is in the hand of the 
government. In practice, political accountability seems to prevail, as the selection, 
appointment and evaluation of top managers is fully dependent on the political power. 
In public owned companies, top managers are entitled to performance bonuses, based 
on a qualitative evaluation. According to a 2006 Court of Auditors report6, although the 
government has not used any explicit performance evaluation process, it is common 
                                                
6 Report n.º49/06 – 2ª Secção, Audit to the pay system of public managers and good corporate governance 
practices, Court of Audits, December 2006 
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practice to pay such performance bonuses to their maximum extent. Another indicator 
of the prevailing political accountability model is the systematic appointment of new 
top managers every time the government changes. Such behaviour is symptomatic of 
the importance politicians give to the personal and political trust factor in detriment of 
more explicit factors like professional and management skills or performance indicators. 
 
Conclusion 
Even if, according to Paige & Wright (1999), this ‘ trust ’ factor is at the origin of 
managers’ choice in all western countries, unless their recruitment system is associated 
to an evaluation model that defines with absolute clarity their objectives, goals and 
performance indicators as well as the real consequences of success or failure, such 
system will never fulfil its intention to provide clear and transparent visibility to public 
management practices. On the long run, managers in public service delivery 
organisations are likely to concentrate on their institutional relationships and pay more 
attention to operational aspects of management, overlooking what should be their major 
concern: providing efficient and effective service, thus contributing to the economic and 
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